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Abstract
The dominant theories about risky decision-making assume that decision conflicts are solved by a compensatory process
involving a trade-off of probability against payoff, but it is unclear whether these theories actually represent the events that
occur when people make a risky decision. By contrasting a preferential choice with a judgment-based choice that required a
compensatory process, we explored the mechanisms underlying risky decision-making. First, using parametric analyses, we
identified the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) as the specific region in charge of task-related conflict in risky
decision-making tasks. We also showed that the dMPFC was activated less when judgment-based choices were being made,
implying that the conflict experienced during a judgment-based choice was not as strong as the conflict that was
experienced during the preferential choice. Our results provide neural evidence that preferential choice cannot be
characterized solely as a compensatory process. Thus, questions were raised about whether existing compensatory theories
could adequately describe individual risky decisions.
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Introduction
Risky decisions become difficult when the payoff and probabil-
ity are in conflict. Mainstream theories of decision-making under
risk, from expected utility theory [1] to prospect theory [2,3,4],
assume that the problem of decision conflict can be solved by a
compensatory process that trades probability for payoff. Thus, the
attractiveness of a bet offering payoffs (x1,… ,xn) with probabilities
(p1,… ,pn) is given by its mathematical expectation
X n
i~1
u(xi)fi(p),
where u denotes the utility function fi(p) for vector p and different
functions indexed by i take appropriate elements of vector p and
weight them. This idea seems simple and straightforward because
decision-makers are only required to compute the mathematical
expectation of each alternative with respect to function f before
choosing the option that maximizes overall value or utility.
This assumption has led neuroscientists to attempt to identify
the neural basis for each of the components that are required to
produce an overall value or utility. Neuroimaging studies have
identified potential neural substrates associated with payoff and
probability [5,6,7,8]. Neural structures reported to be activated in
a representation of a payoff include the orbitofrontal cortex,
insula, thalamus and striatum [9,10,11,12,13]. Activations of the
lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), the posterior parietal cortex (PPC),
and the insular cortices have been correlated with probability in
previous studies [6,14,15,16,17,18]. Specifically, researchers have
suggested that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex might play a role
in risky decision making by computing decision utility [8].
However, it remains unclear whether the compensatory model
actually represents what happens when people make a risky decision.
The processes of weighing and summing have been challenged before
(e.g., [19,20,21]). Researchers have argued that an individual’s
preferential choice can be better described by a non-compensatory
process, such as the lexicographic semi-orders, equate-to-differentiate,
priority heuristic, or single-dimension heuristics [19,22,23,24,25,26].
Non-compensatory models do not allow deficiencies in one attribute to
be compensated for by high values from another attribute. Behavioral
evidence exists that people use only one dimension (either probability
or payoff) at a time to reach a decision [23,27]. Neural evidence also
exists for separate neural mechanisms underlying different strategic
preferences in risky decision making [28,29]. The dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) has been reported to play a strategy-
related role in risky decision-making [8,29].
The debate about whether risky choices are based on a compen-
satory process or a non-compensatory process has a long history.
Recently, the Psychological Review published a series of papers on this
issue [26,30,31,32,33,34,35,36]. Using behavioral data, Brandsta ¨tter,
Gigerenzer and Hertwig contended that their non-compensatory
model was more accurate than compensatory theories [23,26,33].
However, other researchers have also used behavioral data to support
compensatory theories [30,32,34,35,36]. Thus, to date, behavioral data
have not been able to resolve this controversy.
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non-compensatory processes appears to be associated with the
differences in the solutions to conflicts between binary alternatives
[37]. According to the compensatory rule, individuals are forced to
weigh and sum all of the possible outcomes to assign a
unidimensional value to each alternative, thereby exposing the
individuals’ preferences [38]. One alternative comes to dominate
the other along the unidimension, and the conflict is resolved [20].
In this compensatory process, a stronger conflict induced by
maximization would result when less of a difference was
determined to exist between the overall values or the utilities of
two alternatives on the unidimension alone. Non-compensatory
rules, on the other hand, forgo weighing and summing. Instead,
these rules eliminate any alternative that has a low value in one
dimension, even if that alternative rates highly in the other
dimension. Because the decision is not based on a unidimensional
value, no alternative would strongly dominate the others in terms
of overall attributes. When people are unable to find a dominant
alternative, they experience conflict [26]. In this non-compensa-
tory process, a higher conflict would be related to greater
intradimensional differences between the two alternatives for both
dimensions (i.e., payoff and probability).
Because few behavioral indices for monitoring internal conflict
have been described [39], and because behavioral indices might
not directly reflect the internal process, researchers have not been
able to use behavioral data to resolve whether risky choices are
based on compensatory or non-compensatory processes in
situations where internal conflict exists. Considering that neuro-
imaging may be useful for detecting internal conflict, we
conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
to explore generic risk-related processing. Keeping in mind the
distinct differences between compensatory and non-compensatory
processes in conflict situations, we focused on the neural basis of
conflict monitoring by contrasting a judgment-based choice task
with a preferential choice task. The difference between the two
tasks was that the judgment-based choice task required partici-
pants to perform a compensatory process of trading off probability
against payoff by using the certainty equivalent method [40,41],
but the preferential choice task did not explicitly require
participants to perform a compensatory or non-compensatory
process.
Using the two factors (i.e., the unidimensional difference
between overall values or utilities of two alternatives on the
unidimension alone and the intradimensional difference between
two alternatives on the payoff/probability dimension) as the
parameters for separate parametric analyses, we identified the
conflict-related brain region in our study of risky decision making.
Then, we showed differential neural sensitivities to these
parameters between the preferential choice and the judgment-
based choice. Finally, we showed evidence that the intensity of
inner conflict revealed by our identified conflict-related region was
less pronounced in the compensatory choice (i.e., the judgment-
based choice) than in the preferential choice. These neural
measurements will help us to better understand the processes that
underlie compensatory and non-compensatory decision making
and to address the question of whether risky choices are guided by
a compensatory process as assumed by expected utility theory and
its extensions.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-six undergraduate or graduate students (11 males,
mean age 22 years, SD 2.81) participated in this study. Three
participants were excluded from the analyses because of excessive
head motion. All participants were in good health with no previous
history of psychiatric or neurological disease, and they gave
written informed consent. The study was approved by both the
Institutional Review Board of the Institute of Psychology, the
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Institutional Review Board
of the Beijing MRI Center for Brain Research.
Experimental design and task
We constructed 60 pairs of two-outcome monetary bets: one
featuring a high probability of winning/losing a modest amount of
money (the P bet), and the other featuring a low probability of
winning/losing a relatively large amount of money (the $ bet)
(Figure 1A). Outcome probabilities of the P bet ranged from 81%
to 97% in 2% or 3% increments, and the outcome probabilities of
the $ bet ranged from 19% to 39% in 2% or 3% increments. The
expected values for the P bets and the $ bets ranged from Chinese
Yuan (CNY) 616 to 644.
In the preferential choice task, participants were asked to select
their preferred bet from each pair. To make the participants
perform a compensatory process, we developed a judgment-based
choice task using the certainty equivalent method [42,43]. This
method has traditionally been based on expected utility theory
[41]. This technique uses a lottery to assess a decision maker’s
preferences over a single attribute (which was either probability or
payoff) range and trade-offs [40]. In the judgment-based choice
task, participants were asked 1) to use the certainty equivalent
method to assess the certain gain/loss equivalent of each bet (in
other words, the cash equivalent that the participants felt would
make them indifferent to the given bet), and 2) the participants
were asked to select the bet with the higher-certainty gain/loss
equivalent from each pair. Participants did not explicitly indicate
the certainty equivalent for each bet before indicating their choice.
In this manner, a compensatory process of trading off probability
against payoff was performed. The order of the tasks was
counterbalanced between the participants. In each of the prefer-
ential and judgment-based choice tasks, half of the participants
were assigned to view the gain trials before the loss trials, and the
other half viewed the trials in the opposite order. The order of the
trials within each domain was randomized, and the order of
domain was counterbalanced between the two tasks and within the
participant group.
Each participant performed both the preferential and judgment-
based choice tasks with an interval of at least 7 days between the
two tasks. Prior to entering the scanner, the participants played a
practice version of either the preferential choice task or the
judgment-based choice task to minimize learning effects during the
actual scanning and to enable them to fully understand the
paradigm. During the scanning, the participants were asked to
perform the tasks with no time constraints. They made their
decisions by pressing one of two buttons corresponding to the
location of the bets on the screen. After the participants’ response,
there was a delay of 8 s before a 2 s fixation procedure started and
indicated the next bets (Figure 1B). There was a 10-min interval
between the gain trials and loss trials for each participant. During
this period, high-resolution structural images were acquired, but
these data were not used in this study. After the scan, participants
were asked whether they integrated the probability and the payoff
to estimate the certainty equivalent for each bet by using a method
similar to the mathematical expectation in the judgment-based
choice task. Twenty-one of twenty-three participants reported that
they integrated the probability and the payoff to estimate the
certainty equivalent for each bet using a method similar to
mathematical expectation. The two negative answers came from
Risky Choices
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mathematical expectation. Participants were also checked to
ensure that they had been fully engaged in each task and clearly
understood the tasks. All participants reported a belief that they
would win or lose money at the end of the tasks. They were told
that at the end of each task, two of their decisions would be
randomly selected to be played for real (one in the gain domain
and the other in the loss domain), and another random device
would determine the outcomes of the selected bets. Both of the
random choices were performed by a MATLAB program. If the
result turned out to be a gain, the participants would receive
money from the experimenter. If the result turned out to be a loss,
the participants would give money to the experimenter or sign an
IOU if they could not afford to make a cash payment. The average
real gain over the two selected bets was ¥29.57 per participant,
whereas the average real loss over the two selected bets was -
¥31.52 per participant. At the completion of the study, the
participants were paid ¥100 in cash for participating, and the
debts/winnings determined by the above method were deducted
from/added to the final payment.
fMRI acquisition
MR images sensitized to changes in BOLD signal levels were
obtained by an echo planar imaging sequence on a 3.0-Tesla
Siemens MR scanner (repetition time=2,000 msec; echo
time=30 msec; flip angle=90u, matrix=64664; field of
view=2206220 mm
2; slice thickness=3 mm; slice gap=1 mm
and, thus, acquisition voxel size=3.463.464m m
3). Each brain
volume was composed of 32 axial sections. Stimuli were presented
with E-prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh,
PA) on a personal computer, back-projected onto a screen using a
liquid crystal display projector and viewed by participants through
a mirror mounted on the MRI head coil. We also acquired a brief
(6-min) resting-state scan, which was composed of 180 volumes
(the data were not used in this study).
fMRI preprocessing and analyses
Image preprocessing and analyses were performed using
statistical parametric mapping (SPM5, Wellcome Department,
London, UK) that was run on a MATLAB 7 platform (Math-
Works, Natick, MA). The first three volumes in each scan series,
which were collected before equilibrium magnetization was
reached, were discarded. The remaining images were corrected
for within-scan acquisition time differences between the slices and
then realigned to the first volume to correct for inter-scan head
motions. Based on a visual inspection of the motion correction
estimates, three participants who had more than 2-mm maximum
displacement in any of the x, y or z directions or more than 2u of
angular rotation about any axis for multiple volumes were
excluded from this study. An additional two participants showed
sudden head motion only in the first trial, which allowed the use of
the imaging data obtained from these two participants after the
first trial was removed. The realigned images were spatially
normalized to the standard EPI template, resampled to
36363m m
3 and smoothed using an 8-mm full-width-at-half-
maximum Gaussian kernel to decrease spatial noise. Motion
parameters were stored and used as nuisance variables in the
following generalized linear model (GLM) analysis.
Individual participant data were analyzed using the general
linear model (GLM) with separate models for each task. Events
Figure 1. Task trial structure. A. Trial types. B. Trial timing. Two bets were presented and the participants’ task was to indicate their decision by
pressing one of two buttons on a response pad.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014756.g001
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with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). To
quantitatively describe the relationship between brain activation
and decision parameters, parametric analyses were performed.
Trials were modeled with parametric regressor modeling (in the
following order): (1) the intradimensional difference in the
probability dimension or in the payoff dimension, and (2) the
unidimensional difference between overall values/utilities of two
bets on the unidimension alone. To avoid a choice in which one
bet dominated the other, all of the bets used in our study were
designed to be choices between high payoffs with low probabilities
and low payoffs with high probabilities. As a consequence, we
observed a significant correlation (r=0.483, p=0.007) between the
differences on the payoff dimension and the differences on the
probability dimension. Thus, an increase in the difference in the
payoff dimension would result in an increase in the difference in
the probability dimension. To avoid the problems induced by
severe co-linearity, we chose one intradimensional difference to
enter into the regressor model at a time. Therefore, there were two
parametric analyses for each task. For example, Model I was
analyzed for the intra-dimensional difference in the probability
dimension and the unidimensional difference, and Model II was
analyzed for the intradimensional difference in the payoff
dimension and the unidimensional difference.
To estimate the intradimensional difference in the payoff dimension
and the intradimensional difference in the probability dimension, we
calculated the utilities for the objective payoff and the decision weights
for the objective probability separately. The utility function and the
probability weighting function were borrowed from cumulative
prospect theory [4], which is a compensatory theory that is considered
to be empirically successful [3]. The selected utility function was the
power function v(x)~
xa ifx§0
{l({x)
b ifxƒ0
 
, and the selected prob-
ability weighting function was an S-shaped weighting function, i.e.,
wz(p)~
pc
(pcz(1{p)
c)
1=c for gains and w{(p)~
pd
(pdz(1{p)
d)
1=d
for losses. We used the following values for each of the parameters:
a=b=0.88, l=2.25, c=0.61andd=0.69, as suggested by Tversky
and Kahneman [4].
To estimate the unidimensional difference between the overall
values/utilities of two bets in the unidimension alone, we calculated
the cumulative prospect utilities of the two bets by applying the
function of cumulative prospect theory V~
X n
i~m
piv(xi)[4]. Accord-
ing to cumulative prospect theory, the utility function is v(x)~
xa ifx§0
{l({x)
b ifxƒ0
 
, and the probability weighting functions are
wz(p)~
pc
(pcz(1{p)
c)
1=c for gains andw{(p)~
pd
(pdz(1{p)
d)
1=d
for losses. The function of overall utility is V~
X n
i~m
piv(xi),w h e r e
pz
i ~Wz(Ai|:::|An){Wz(Aiz1|:::|An),0ƒiƒn{1 p{
i
~W{(A{m|:::|Ai){W{(A{m|:::|Ai{1),1{mƒiƒ0.
All effects were modeled as linear functions of parameter values.
Regressors were serially orthogonalized with the regressors that
were entered later, accounting only for the variance unaccounted
for by regressors that were entered earlier. Participant-specific
movement parameters and linear drift were modeled as covariates
of no interest. A high-pass filter with a cutoff period of 128 s was
used to remove low-frequency noise. Global scaling was not
applied.
First-level (single participant) contrasts were performed sepa-
rately over the mean trial activity (relative to baseline) and for each
of the parametric regressors described above. Second-level (group)
random effect analyses were completed by performing one-sample
t-tests over each of these contrasts. Corrections for multiple
comparisons were carried out at the cluster level using Gaussian
random field theory implemented in SPM5 (min T(22).2.5;
cluster significance: p,0.05, corrected). By using the intradimen-
sional difference in the probability/payoff dimension and the
unidimensional difference between the cumulative prospect
utilities of two bets as parameters, parametric analyses were
conducted to identify brain regions that were sensitive to
intradimensional difference and unidimensional difference. Paired
t-tests were used to further verify the differences in the sensitivity to
the specific decision parameters (p,0.005, uncorrected). To
control for the difference in task difficulty between the two tasks,
the average RT of each participant within each task was taken as
an index of task difficulty and entered into the paired t-test analysis
as a covariate.
Finally, a mask composed of the conflict-related regions that
were sensitive to the unidimensional difference and the intradi-
mensional difference in the payoff or probability dimension was
generated. According to our hypothesis, the conflict-related
regions should be those regions in which the unidimensional
difference between the two offered bets shows a negative
modulation effect or regions in which the intradimensional
difference on the probability/payoff dimension shows a positive
modulation effect (min T(22).2.5; cluster significance: p,0.05,
corrected). Thus, a mask was formed in which each voxel value
was set to one if the voxel satisfied one of the above criteria. The
mask was set to zero if the criteria were not satisfied. To compare
activities (relative to baseline) in the conflict-related regions
between the two tasks, another random-effect paired t-test analysis
controlling for the effect of task difficulty was used to determine
where the second-level group contrasts differed between the
preferential choice task and the judgment-based choice task. This
analysis was limited to the mask (p,0.005, uncorrected).
Results
Behavioral results
Behavioral results are shown in Figures 2A and B. We
conducted a 2 (task: preferential choice vs. judgment-based choice)
62 (domain: gain vs. loss) repeated-measures ANOVA to compare
the mean differences in the proportion of participants selecting the
$ bets. The results revealed that there were no main effects of task
(F(1, 22)=1.29, p.0.05) or domain (F(1, 22)=0.031, p.0.05).
The interaction between task and domain was statistically
significant (F(1, 22)=4.75, p,0.05). A simple effect test indicated
that in the loss domain, participants selected more $ bets in the
preferential choice task than in the judgment-based choice task
(p,0.05).
We also conducted an ANOVA to compare the reaction time
difference between the two tasks. Analyses of reaction time
revealed that the participants took more time to make a judgment-
based choice than to make a preferential choice (F(1, 22)=10.90,
p,0.01). They also took more time to make a decision in the loss
domain than in the gain domain (F(1, 22)=7.77, p,0.05). The
interaction between task and domain was not significant (F(1,
22)=2.32, p.0.05).
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were then conducted
to examine the influence of the intradimensional and unidimen-
sional differences between the two bets on the absolute difference
between the proportion of participants selecting the $ bet and the
proportion of participants selecting the P bet in each pair
(hereafter, proportion selecting difference) in two tasks. In the
Risky Choices
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dimension and in the payoff dimension were entered into the
analysis using the enter method. In the second block, unidimen-
sional differences between overall values/utilities of two bets were
included using the stepwise method because it can identify those
factor(s) for which the significance level is less than 5%. The
included unidimensional differences between the two bets were
derived from expected value (EV) theory, expected utility (EU)
theory (where U=ln(x) or U=lg(x)), and the cumulative prospect
theory (where a=0.88, l=2, c=0.61, d= 0.69, or a=0.88,
l=2.25, c=0.61, d=0.69).
For the preferential choice task, all of the unidimensional
differences between overall values/utilities of two bets were
excluded as predictors from the final regression model. There
was an independent negative relationship between the intradimen-
sional difference in the payoff dimension and the proportion
selecting difference between the two bets (t=22.019, standardized
beta=20.371, p,0.05), implying that a larger difference in the
payoff dimension could effectively induce a smaller proportion
selecting difference between the two bets (i.e., participants chose
more evenly). There were no other significant effects (all absolute
t#1.436, all absolute standardized beta#0.264, all p$0.157).
For the judgment-based choice task, inclusion of the unidimen-
sional differences in expected values, cumulative prospect utilities
(where a=0.88, l=2, c=0.61, d=0.69), and cumulative
prospect utilities (where a=0.88, l=2.25, c=0.61, d=0.69) in
the second block produced a significant F-change (F=7.343,
p,0.001, adjusted R
2=0.350), while the unidimensional differ-
ences between expected utilities (where U=ln(x) or U=lg(x)) were
excluded as predictors from the final regression model. In the final
model, the unidimensional difference in cumulative prospect
utilities (where a=0.88, l=2.25, c=0.61, d=0.69) (t=2.424,
standardized beta=5.437, p,0.05) and in expected values
(t=0.501, standardized beta=3.916, p,0.001) showed positive
relationships with the proportion selecting difference, while the
unidimensional difference in cumulative prospect utilities (where
a=0.88, l=2,c=0.61, d=0.69) showed a negative relationship
with the proportion selecting difference (t=22.709, standardized
beta=25.599, p,0.01). The fact that the standardized beta
coefficient of cumulative prospect utilities (where a=0.88,
l=2.25, c=0.61, d=0.69) was the largest positive coefficient
suggests that the greater unidimensional difference (i.e., the greater
difference in cumulative prospect utilities where a=0.88, l=2.25,
c=0.61, d=0.69) between the two bets could effectively induce a
greater proportion selecting difference between the two bets (i.e.,
participants chose less evenly).
Neuroimaging results
We performed whole-brain analyses to identify brain regions
exhibiting parametric increases or decreases in BOLD signals while
specifically tracking changes in the intradimensional difference and
the unidimensional difference. In the parametric regressor model
with the intradimensional difference in the probability dimension
and the unidimensional difference between the cumulative prospect
utilities of two bets as parameters (Model I), a positive correlation
with the intradimensional difference was observed in the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) that extended to the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC)., and no opposite effects were observed in the
preferential choice task. This positive modulation effect meant that
the activity of the region increased when the difference in the
probability dimension increased, just as we hypothesized. However,
in the judgment-based choice task, no regions were sensitive to the
intradimensional difference in the probability dimension (min
T(22).2.5; cluster significance: p,0.05, corrected) (Table 1). A
negative correlation with the unidimensional difference was
observed in the dMPFC, the left temporal regions and the bilateral
visual cortices. No opposite effects were observed in the judgment-
based choice task. This negative modulation effect meant that the
activity of the region increased when the difference between the
cumulative prospect utilities of two bets decreased. In the
preferential choice task, however, no regions were sensitive to the
unidimensional difference (min T(22).2.5; cluster significance:
p,0.05, corrected) (Table 1). Paired t-tests controlling for the effect
of task difficulty further verified the differences in the sensitivity to
the parameters. In brief, we found that the dMPFC showed both
decreased sensitivity to the intradimensional difference in the
probability dimension (MNI spatial coordinates ofpeakvoxel: x=9,
y=63, z=15, T=4.03) (Figure 3A) and increased sensitivity to the
unidimensional difference in the judgment-based choice task
compared to the preferential choice task (MNI spatial coordinates
of peak voxel: x=26, y=45, z=51, T=4.26) (p,0.005,
uncorrected) (Figure 3B).
Similarly, in the parametric regressor model with the intradi-
mensional difference in the payoff dimension and the unidimen-
Figure 2. Behavioral results. A. Mean proportion of participants selecting $ bets. B. Reaction time as a function of task. The error bars denote the
standard deviation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014756.g002
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bets as parameters (Model II), a positive correlation with the
intradimensional difference in the payoff dimension was observed
in the MPFC in the preferential choice task (min T(22).2.5;
cluster significance: p,0.05, corrected). However, in the judg-
ment-based choice task, no regions were sensitive to the
intradimensional difference in the payoff dimension (min
T(22).2.5; cluster significance: p,0.05, corrected) (Table 2). A
paired t-test controlling for the effect of task difficulty further
verified the differences in the sensitivity to this intradimensional
difference by finding decreased sensitivity to this parameter in the
MPFC in the judgment-based choice task compared to the
preferential choice task (min T(22).2.5; cluster significance:
p,0.05, corrected) (MNI spatial coordinates of peak voxel: x=3,
y=60, z=30, T=3.89) (Figure 3C). A negative correlation with
the unidimensional difference was observed in the bilateral visual
cortices (min T(22).2.5; cluster significance: p,0.05, corrected)
and the MPFC (which survived the height but not the extent
threshold) in the judgment-based choice task but not in the
preferential choice task. Although the pattern in sensitivity to the
unidimensional difference within each task was similar to the
sensitivity in Model I, the differences between the two tasks in this
model (Model II) were not significant in the MPFC even under an
uncorrected threshold of p,0.01.
Finally, we compared activities (relative to baseline) in the
conflict-related regions between the two tasks to test whether the
intensity of inner conflict was less pronounced in the judgment-
based choice than in the preferential choice. Based on the
parametric analyses, the conflict-related regions that were sensitive
to the unidimensional difference and the intradimensional
difference in the probability/payoff dimension were obtained.
Because the BOLD activities (relative to baseline) in the Model I
were exactly the same as the activities in Model II and because
both models were based on the same task regressor, we only
showed the results from Model I. Using Model I, the dMPFC
showed increased activity in the preferential choice task compared
to the judgment-based choice task (p,0.005, uncorrected)
(Table 3). No regions showed decreased activity in the preferential
choice task compared to the judgment-based choice task.
Discussion
Understanding the underlying mechanism of decision making
under risk remains a fundamental and difficult problem. Although
there has been much debate about whether risky choice is based
on compensatory or non-compensatory processes, to our knowl-
edge, nothing has previously emerged to give decision analyst a
pause about using the compensatory rule as the fundamental
principle of decision making. The family of compensatory theories
has kept its dominant position, in part through continuing
generations of prospect theory [2,3,4], which is a theory that has
been widely accepted as empirically successful. The present study,
however, provided several interesting results with implications for
the underlying mechanisms of risky choices. We found that (1)
Table 1. Regions sensitive to the intradimensional difference in the probability dimension and regional sensitivity to the
unidimensional difference within each task.
Regressor
Cluster
size Region BAs Peak MNI coordinates Peak T value
Intradimensional difference in the probability dimension
Preference
choice task
Positive modulation
1781 Bilateral dorsal and ventromedial
MPFC extending to ACC
6/8/9/10/
11/24/32
0 66 27 6.66
Negative modulation
none
Judgment-based
choice task
none
Unidimensional difference on the CPT utility
Preference
choice task
none
Judgment-based
choice task
Positive modulation
none
Negative modulation
737 Left inferior and
middle temporal gyrus
20/21/37 245 245 215 5.14
2582 Bilateral visual cortex and cerebellum
extending to posterior cingulate cortex
21 2105 26 5.1
621 Bilateral dMPFC extending to the
right superior and middle frontal gyrus
227 21 48 4.23
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014756.t001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e14756high-probability bets tended to be avoided in the loss domain in
the preferential choice task, but this tendency decreased in the
judgment-based choice task; (2) participants took more time to
make a judgment-based choice than to make a preferential choice;
(3) participants chose more evenly as the unidimensional difference
between the two bets decreased in the judgment-based choice task,
whereas participants chose more evenly as the intradimensional
difference between two bets increased in the preferential choice
task; (4) the dMPFC activation increased as the unidimensional
difference between the two bets decreased in the judgment-based
choice task, whereas activation increased as the intra-dimensional
difference in the payoff dimension increased in the preferential
choice task; (5) the dMPFC showed more activity during the
preferential choice task than during the judgment-based task.
These results generally supported our hypothesis that preferential
choice may not be a purely compensatory process.
What (and how long) to choose?
The choice result revealed that our participants tended to
choose one member of the pair but set a higher certainty
equivalent for the other pair. However, the observations
made about preferential choice could still be interpreted by
compensatory proponents as being guided by a compensatory rule.
For instance, the contingent weighting model [42] and
third-generation prospect theory [3] were developed to recon-
cile compensatory processing with the preference reversal
phenomenon.
Previous research also reported that compensatory processing
takes more time than non-compensatory processing [43,44]
because the decision-making mechanism is a two-stage process
in compensatory processing. According to the compensatory
models of risky choices, individuals have to compute the
mathematical expectation first and then choose the option with
the higher overall value or utility. Note that if a decision maker
selects an option with the greatest overall value or utility
(presumably determined by the certainty equivalent method) in a
preferential choice, the judgment-based and preferential tasks
should employ the same decision-making process and, presum-
ably, require the same amount of time. The finding that the
participants took more time to make a judgment-based choice
than to make a preferential choice suggests that our preferential
choice task may employ a process besides compensation.
A novel behavioral finding was that the intradimensional
difference and the unidimensional difference influenced preferen-
tial choice and judgment-based choice, respectively, in terms of the
absolute difference between the proportion of participants
selecting the $ bet and the proportion of participants selecting
the P bet in each pair. Such a finding suggests that the impact of
intradimensional versus unidimensional differences between two
bets is task dependent (task specific). Thus, preferential choice is
influenced by intradimensional differences but not by unidimen-
sional differences between two bets, whereas judgment-based
choice is influenced by unidimensional differences but not by
intradimensional differences between two bets. Notably, an even
Table 2. Regional sensitivity to the intradimensional difference in the payoff dimension and regional sensitivity to the
unidimensional difference within each task.
Regressor Cluster size Region BAs Peak MNI coordinates Peak T value
Intradimensional difference on the payoff dimension
Preference choice task
Positive modulation
379 Bilateral dMPFC 12 63 27 4.77
Negative modulation
none
Judgment-based choice task
none
Unidimensional difference on the CPT utility
Preference choice task
none
Judgment-based choice task
Positive modulation
none
Negative modulation
2008 Bilateral visual cortex
and cerebellum
18 287 29 6.01
56 Left ventromedial MPFC* 10 215 54 29 3.68
50 Left dMPFC* 10 215 36 33 3.34
*Two clusters located in the left MPFC survived the height but not the extent threshold.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014756.t002
Figure 3. Brain regions tracking variations in decision parameters. MPFC showed differences in sensitivity to the intradimensional difference
in the probability dimension in Model I (A), in sensitivity to the unidimensional difference in Model I (B), and in sensitivity to the intradimensional
difference in the payoff dimension in Model II (C). In the left column, the region was displayed in a T1-weighted MRI template. In the right column,
the mean parameter estimates of the corresponding region in the two choice tasks were shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014756.g003
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that participants were unable to detect a dominance relationship
between the bets and thus experienced great conflict.
Which region is in charge of conflict monitoring in risky
decision making?
Cognitive neuroimaging and neuropsychology studies have
consistently shown that the ACC/dMPFC, which has been widely
interpreted to respond to the presence of conflict [28,29,45,46,47],
is critically active in a wide variety of cognitive settings. In
particular, the ACC/dMPFC has been suggested to be a
monitoring center from which a conflict signal detected by the
ACC/dMPFC is transmitted to other brain regions [45].
However, the conflict-related regions in these studies have not
been precisely pinpointed in relation to risky decision making.
Moreover, it should be noted that other interpretations of the
functional role of ACC/dMPFC have been developed, such as
error likelihood [48,49], regret [50], action value [51,52], response
evaluation [53], and uncertainty [54,55,56].
Considering that the functional role of the ACC/dMPFC might
be context-specific [55], we attempted to identify whether the
activity of ACC/dMPFC could be related to conflict monitoring in
our study using parametric analyses. The result of this indepen-
dent study revealed that the activation of the dMPFC showed
great sensitivity to the unidimensional difference and the
intradimensional difference. In the judgment-based choice, the
activation in the dMPFC was highest when the cumulative
prospect utilities of the two bets were closest. However, in the
preferential choice task, the activation was the highest when the
intradimensional difference between the two bets was the highest.
These findings combined with the proportion selecting difference
results led us to consider that the dMPFC was in charge of task-
related conflict in the tasks performed in this study. This result is
consistent with those of a recent study published by Venkatraman
and colleagues (2009), which showed that similar regions play an
important role in decision conflict [28].
As our interpretations were made under the very particular
conditions of risky decision making tasks, this interpretation should
be regarded as tentative until further work excludes alternative
interpretations.
How to solve conflict?
Guided by the different theoretical orientations, researchers
have proposed different possible resolutions to conflict from the
compensatory and non-compensatory points of view. In the debate
between the compensatory and non-compensatory models, various
behavioral methods, ranging from off-line questionnaires [23] to
Mouselab [34], have been used. However, the extant behavioral
literature appears to be inconclusive. Our study, therefore, was an
attempt to overcome this difficulty by examining behavioral and
neural data and their relation to the bet parameters.
When there was a choice available between high payoffs with
low probabilities and low payoffs with high probabilities, the
participants seemed to employ a less mathematically complex
strategy to make decisions in the preferential choice situation
because these decisions were associated with faster response time.
More importantly, the hierarchical multiple regression analyses
suggested that participants used different strategies to make
decision in two tasks. In the preferential choice task, increased
proportion selecting difference was associated with a decrease in
the difference in the payoff dimension, implying that the conflict
pattern (in terms of the proportion selecting difference) in the
preferential choice resulted from using a non-compensatory
process without trading off probability against payoff. In the
judgment-based choice task, on the other hand, increased
proportion selecting difference was associated with an increase in
the unidimensional difference (estimated using cumulative pros-
pect theory), implying that the conflict pattern in the judgment-
based choice was induced by the use of a compensatory process of
trading off probability against payoff. Furthermore, we found a
clear difference in the activation of the dMPFC between the
responses to the two parameters in the two different tasks. The
parametric analyses revealed that the parameters of the unidi-
mensional difference (estimated using cumulative prospect theory)
were poor predictors of dMPFC activation in the preferential
choice but were good predictors of dMPFC activation in the
judgment-based choice. In contrast, the parameters of the
intradimensional difference (payoff and probability separately)
were good predictors of the dMPFC activation in the preferential
choice, but they were poor predictors of dMPFC activation in
judgment-based choice. These results provided behavioral and
neural evidence that preferential choice is non-compensatory, or at
least not purely compensatory.
To the extent that dMPFC activity has been identified as
playing an important role in conflict monitoring, our finding that
dMPFC activation increased during the preferential choice task
suggests that the conflict participants experienced during the
judgment-based choice was not as strong as the conflict
experienced during the preferential choice. This finding strength-
ens our doubt that individuals were seeking a dominant alternative
as a means of solving decision conflict by using the weighing and
summing process that was suggested by a compensatory rule.
A limitation of our study is that we only completed a global
check rather than a trial-by-trial check by asking participants to
explicitly indicate the certainty equivalence for each bet during
scanning. There is a possibility that participants’ certainty
Table 3. Regions showing differences in activation between the preferential choice task and the judgment-based choice task.
Cluster size Region BAs Peak MNI coordinates Peak T value
Preferential choice task . Judgment-based choice task
69 Left inferior and middle temporal gyrus 37 248 236 212 4.23
18 Left inferior temporal gyrus 21 242 3 236 3.71
12 Right dMPFC 10 6 66 24 3.61
14 Left dMPFC 10 215 66 24 3.39
Preferential choice task . Judgment-based choice task
none
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014756.t003
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the value of a gamble in the judgment-based choice task. Although
the longer RT and the positive relationship between the
proportion selecting difference and the unidimensional difference
in the judgment-based choice task provide indirect evidence that
participants tend to follow the certainty equivalent method when
making a judgment-based choice, further research should continue
to examine this possibility.
In summary, by examining brain activity, we supported our
hypothesis that preferential choice cannot be characterized as a
compensatory process with the aim of maximizing the overall
value of a prospect in a conflict solution. Rather, it seems that
preferential choice may be a non-compensatory process that is
accompanied by strong conflicts. Together, these results tell a
simple story: selection of the bet with the greatest overall value
may appear to be an ideal way to solve conflict, but it does not
capture the nature of risky decision making. Our study, from a
perspective of decision conflict, attempted to address the issue of
whether risky choices are based on a compensatory process. This
perspective could potentially lead to a better understanding of the
underlying mechanism of risky decision-making, which could
present important directions for future research.
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